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THE MYTH OF THE FULLY INFORMED RATIONAL ACTOR

STEPHANOS BIBAS*
I. THE OUTDATED LAISSEZ-FAIRE MODEL OF THE PLEA BARGAINING MARKET
Traditionally, American criminal procedure has treated the jury trial as the
norm, the basic event protected by the Bill of Rights and rules of criminal
procedure. The Supreme Court has developed a range of doctrines to ensure
fair jury selection and instructions, confrontation and cross-examination, and
the like. But when it comes to waiving a jury trial and pleading guilty, the
Court has largely assumed that defendants can readily forecast the costs and
benefits of pleading guilty and do so only if plea bargaining serves their
interests. Put another way, the Court has taken a laissez-faire, hands-off
approach, assuming that plea bargaining is a rational and well-functioning
market in which price signals obviate regulation. Free markets require only the
most modest regulation to prevent force, threats, fraud, and deceit;
governments need not go much further to help buyers assess the substantive
desirability of deals. In this respect, the case law presupposes economists’
stylized model of plea bargaining, in which each party chooses to enter into a
plea agreement only if there is “mutuality of advantage.”1 The defendant gets
a lower sentence; in exchange, the prosecution frees up time and money to
pursue more defendants, and may also purchase one defendant’s testimony or
cooperation to use against others.
The free market works pretty well for commercial transactions, in which
enough market participants are sophisticated and shop around that sellers must
lower prices for everyone to match the going rate. That model roughly
describes much bargaining over civil settlements, where each side usually
maximizes its own dollar recovery and attorneys’ fees are often pegged to a
percentage of their clients’ recoveries.
Unfortunately, plea bargaining is far from a well-functioning market with
transparent, competitive prices. For starters, the prosecutor is a monopsonist,
the only buyer with whom a defendant can shop unless he will risk going to

* Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Pennsylvania. Thanks to Josh Bowers and
my co-panelists, Gabriel Jack Chin and Margaret Colgate Love, for our illuminating discussions
on this topic.
1. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
79

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

80

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXI:79

trial.2 The prosecutor probably is not looking to maximize the overall
punishment or sentence, but rather is seeking to guarantee a conviction and
willing to trade off severity for certainty. Likewise, the defense lawyer, often
underpaid and overworked, has strong interests in moving his docket by
getting his clients to plead quickly. Appointed defense lawyers are often paid
a salary, a flat fee, or a low fee per case, so there is little incentive to invest
extra work and resources to turn over every stone.3 Also, defense lawyers vary
greatly in their skills, experience, and relationships with prosecutors, which
can further influence plea bargaining outcomes.4 Nevertheless, the Court put
great faith in defense lawyers’ advice as the key to making defendants’ pleas
knowing and voluntary and set a very high bar for overturning pleas based on
deficient legal advice.5
Perhaps the biggest problem is the assumption that defendants have
enough information to rationally forecast their guilt and expected sentences
and whether it makes sense to plead guilty. Most defendants do indeed know
whether they are guilty of something and whether they have an obvious
defense, and most guilty defendants have a reasonable idea of the witnesses
and other evidence against them.6 But criminal cases are much more complex
than binary judgments of guilt or innocence. Often, there is a range of criminal
charges that can fit a criminal transaction, and prosecutors start out stacking
multiple charges only to bargain some away. There also is usually a range of
criminal sentences that can fit a particular charge. That is most obvious in
unstructured-sentencing systems, in which a judge can give zero to twenty
years for a robbery, for example. Structured sentencing systems, though
narrower, still preserve a range over which the parties can bargain. In the
federal system, for example, the top of the range is at least 25% higher than the
bottom.7 Even when mandatory-minimum penalties can apply, prosecutors
may agree to drop charges, let them run concurrently, or recommend
reductions below the minimum in exchange for cooperation against other
defendants.8

2. See Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L.
REV. 1471, 1477–88 (1993); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory
System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 64–66 (1988).
3. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2464, 2477 (2004).
4. Id. at 2480–82.
5. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
6. Even so, stingy discovery rules can hurt defendants, especially those who are innocent or
were too intoxicated or mentally ill to remember the details. Bibas, supra note 3, at 2494.
7. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (2006) (limiting top of guidelines range to 25% or six months
above the bottom of the range, whichever is greater); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
ch. 5, pt. A tbl. (2011) (setting forth federal sentencing ranges).
8. Bibas, supra note 3, at 2485.
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Today, criminal convictions not only carry prison terms and fines, but also
trigger a range of so-called collateral consequences. A violent-crime
conviction may cost a convict his right to carry a gun and thus to work as a
police officer or security guard. A sex-offense conviction, even for flashing or
public urination, may require a convict to register as a sex offender and not live
in large parts of cities near schools, parks, or playgrounds. A drug conviction
may count as an aggravated felony, making a noncitizen automatically
removable from the country. These consequences can matter greatly to
defendants;9 someone who has lived in America for decades and has family
here may care far more about deportation than about a sentence of probation or
a few months in jail. But because these consequences are nominally civil, they
are not mentioned in plea agreements or plea colloquies. Traditionally, neither
judges nor defense lawyers have mentioned them to their clients, as they are
imposed by civil agencies and statutes rather than criminal courts.10 Criminal
proceedings remained formally divorced from civil ones, even though
collateral consequences have in effect become predictable parts of the total
punishment package. And often, especially in cases of moderate severity, that
package is negotiable. Traditionally, a criminal defense lawyer might ask to
have a one-year sentence bumped up from 365 to 366 days, to qualify his client
for good-time credits. But where a one-year sentence is the threshold for
deportation, prosecutors and judges often will agree to lower a sentence by a
day, to 364 days, if a defense lawyer is knowledgeable enough to request such
a favor.11 Savvy, experienced defense lawyers knew enough to advise their
clients and try to bargain over these consequences where possible, but many
others did not.
All too often, however, these plea-bargaining issues remained below the
Court’s radar. Guilty pleas, and especially plea bargains, waive most possible
appellate issues. Thus, disproportionately few plea-bargained cases make it all
the way up to the Supreme Court’s docket. Confronting an unrepresentative
sample of cases, the Court continued to hyper-regulate trials while leaving plea
bargaining largely untouched.12

9. See Gabriel J. Chin and Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the
Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 700 (2002).
10. Id.
11. See, e.g., State v. Quintero Morelos, 137 P.3d 114, 119 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006); 1
NORTON TOOBY & JOSEPH ROLLIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE OF IMMIGRANTS § 10.1 (4th ed. 2007).
12. See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1118–19 (2011).
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II. PADILLA’S RECOGNITION OF PLEA BARGAINING REALITIES
The traditional model has long since become an anachronism for the 95%
of defendants who plead guilty.13 What they need is not a litany of boilerplate
warnings about the procedural trial rights they are waiving, as criminal
procedure rules require,14 because for most, a jury trial was never a serious
option and the various trial procedures were immaterial. Rather, they need
clear information about the substantive outcomes they will face and how good
a deal they are receiving. They need to know not only the prison and parole
terms but also whether they will lose custody of their children or be deported,
forbidden to live at home, or barred from working in their profession.
The bar had begun to acknowledge these realities. Bar publications
explained how to spot and understand immigration consequences of criminal
convictions, and continuing legal education programs taught criminal defense
attorneys how to navigate the thicket of immigration consequences.15 Good,
experienced criminal defense attorneys increasingly saw explaining these
consequences as part of representing the whole client’s interests within the
criminal case. But less experienced attorneys and those who do not specialize
in criminal or immigration law remained ignorant or unconcerned with
consequences beyond the criminal sentence itself. Thus, many defendants
were unpleasantly surprised, taking seemingly lenient pleas only to discover
that they had unwittingly agreed to be deported.
In Padilla v. Kentucky, the Court for the first time confronted this cluster
of issues in interpreting the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of effective
assistance of counsel.16 The Court acknowledged that plea bargaining is no
longer a negligible exception to the norm of trials; it is the norm.17 A
defendant who pleads guilty is not getting some exceptional break, but ought to
be getting the going rate. In contrast, the defendant who goes to trial will
probably receive a heavier sentence than usual, just as only a few suckers pay
full sticker price for a car. A range of options is on the table, and defendants
need to explore where within that range they can fall. A competent defense
lawyer “may be able to plea bargain creatively with the prosecutor in order to
craft a conviction and sentence” that serves both the prosecution’s and the
defense’s interests.18 The parties trade risks for certainty and may likewise

13. Id.
14. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
15. See generally J. McGregor Smyth, From Arrest to Reintegration: A Model for Mitigating
Collateral Consequences of Criminal Proceedings, CRIM. JUST., Fall 2009, at 42 (describing
ways to mitigate collateral consequences).
16. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
17. Id. at 1485 & n.13.
18. Id. at 1486.
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agree to heavier criminal sentences or restitution in exchange for avoiding
collateral consequences.19
Plea bargaining is thus not an esoteric corner of the market reserved for
indisputably guilty defendants who should be happy to receive any lower
sentences as a matter of grace. It is the market, and defendants need competent
advice about the facets and consequences of the transaction before they agree
to a deal. A corollary is that a fair deal requires more than a rubber stamp by a
lawyer with a pulse. Defense lawyers must explain not only the criminal
sentences, but also the other consequences that will clearly flow from the
convictions.20 Not only affirmative misadvice, but even failure to offer advice
where the correct advice is clear, violates the Sixth Amendment.21 That means
that defendants are not left to fend for themselves, but have an affirmative right
to at least minimally competent advice.
Padilla thus goes well beyond the night watchman state’s minimal
regulation of force, threats, fraud, misrepresentations, and broken promises in
an otherwise laissez-faire market. It imposes an affirmative obligation: the
state must ensure that defendants have counsel who will help them to
understand and evaluate the substantive merits of plea deals. The goal is not
simply to forbid inaccurate or coerced pleas, but to promote a more robust and
intelligent choice among alternative outcomes. That goes much further than
Santobello’s ban on broken promises22 or Brady’s ban on threats,
misrepresentations, and bribes.23 Brady had also required judges and counsel
to explain the direct consequences authorized by the plea,24 but Padilla
significantly extended that disclosure requirement as well.
Looking backwards, one might see something vaguely similar in earlier
cases that trusted competent defense counsel to ensure fair deals.25 But Padilla
imposes a much more robust and affirmative requirement on counsel. It
follows the accumulated wisdom of the bar and the academy in gradually
explicating defense lawyers’ professional obligations. Rather than creating a
new duty out of whole cloth, Padilla takes an incremental, common-law
approach to discerning the minimum that a client can expect. That minimum
need not mirror best practices, but at least it evolves to adapt to new pleabargaining realities in a fluid market.

19. Id.
20. See, e.g., id. at 1481–82.
21. Id. at 1483; see also id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring) (proposing a rule that would go
beyond forbidding misadvice to require a generic warning to consult an immigration attorney
about possible immigration consequences).
22. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261–62 (1971).
23. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246
F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)).
24. Id. at 754–55.
25. E.g., id. at 756–57; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769–71 (1970).
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III. THEORETICAL MODELS VERSUS REALITY
At root, the Padilla decision has gone a great way toward rejecting the
simplistic assumption that defendants are fully informed rational actors.
Anyone who has practiced criminal law for any length of time knows that few
defendants resemble a cool, calculating, cerebral Vulcan. Many are hampered
by poor education, low intelligence, and limited proficiency in English. Many
mistrust their appointed defense lawyers, assuming that lawyers whom they are
not paying are not looking out for their interests. More importantly, though
some defendants are experienced recidivists and think they know the system,
few understand the process, the legalese, and the realistic range of outcomes
very well. Up until now, our system has trusted judges’ boilerplate plea
colloquies, which are mostly about foregone procedural rights rather than the
substantive merits of deals and which largely rubber stamp deals already
struck. Defendants need substantive information about likely outcomes before
they strike deals from defense lawyers familiar with their particular cases.
Padilla cannot solve all of these problems.
Given the chronic
underfunding of criminal defense counsel and the wide variations in their
quality and workloads, no constitutional doctrine could. But it begins to attack
the problem of poor information and chronic misunderstandings in plea
bargaining. One of the worst aspects of collateral consequences is that, even
though they are often predictable, they are hidden because they take place
outside the criminal courtroom. Padilla brings them out into the light. That
will not help all defendants: those facing very serious charges, or those whose
criminal transactions are extremely simple, may face deportation regardless
and have little room to bargain. But it warns them of what is coming down the
pike and empowers them to explore whether there is anything they can do.
There are many other ways to provide more information to complement
Padilla’s new right to information about deportation. Padilla’s right may or
may not ultimately reach other consequences such as loss of custody,
employment, public housing, or residency restrictions.
Even if the
Constitution does not require it, good defense lawyers should mention at least
these serious consequences where they are likely to apply. Likewise, statutes
and rules of criminal procedure can learn lessons from another area of law that
has experimented with imparting useful information to inexperienced market
participants: consumer-protection law. Laws could require putting plea
agreements in writing and in plain English, with graphics to help defendants
grasp numbers and comparisons. They could forbid or disfavor high-pressure
tactics, such as threats to prosecute a family member, and require cooling-off
periods before accepting serious felony pleas. Mildly pro-defendant default
rules of construction could force prosecutors to set out their understandings
and terms clearly, so that defendants will focus on them. And most of all,
defense lawyers need not only better funding and lower caseloads, but also
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better training and checklists to keep them from overlooking common issues
and concerns.
The root problem, however, is deeper and harder to fix. There are two
distinct barriers to informed decision-making: first, defendants must have
enough information; and second, they must be able to understand, digest, and
use that information. Almost all of our efforts, from Boykin on,26 have gone
into the first requirement. If some information is good, we reason, then more
must be better. Padilla makes sure that defendants get some good information
about immigration consequences. But that important information risks
drowning, unnoticed, amidst the many other warnings that defendants receive
in preparation for and during their plea colloquy. Litany after boilerplate litany
can cause defendants to tune out, as the unimportant procedural wallpaper of a
plea colloquy masks the crucial substantive information on which defendants
ought to be focusing. Mandatory disclosures often fail for this very reason.27
Less is more. But trial judges and legislatures are unlikely to pare back
warnings, lest some appellate court reverse a conviction for omitting some
minor point. As happens with jury instructions, warnings can encrust the plea
process like barnacles, becoming verbose and incomprehensible. If it could be
done, boiling down information to a simple grade or report card, and training
defense counsel to offer better advice, would help more.28
Improving the advice of counsel would also address a second problem with
our current over-reliance on judges’ advisements at plea colloquies: the
information comes too late to be of help. By the time of the plea colloquy, the
defendant is not legally but psychologically committed to the deal. Given
psychological sunk costs, time pressures, and all actors’ desires to get things
over with, defendants have almost no time to reflect and weigh collateralconsequence information if it comes at the end of the process. They need
substantive information about criminal and collateral civil penalties when they
are weighing the deal in earnest.
There are concrete things defense lawyers can do to improve the timely
advice that defendants receive. As Professor Jack Chin suggests, defender
organizations can collaborate to create and update lists of collateral
consequences for each jurisdiction, as the ABA is in the process of doing, and
then to turn these into usable checklists.29 Lawyers must also question their
clients and then summarize the most serious and common consequences

26. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
27. Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA.
L. REV. 647, 737–38 (2011).
28. Id. at 743–44.
29. Gabriel J. Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral
Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54 HOW. L.J. 675, 685–87 (2011).
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applicable to each client’s situation.30 They must, for example, learn their
clients’ citizenship and professions in order to figure out whether they may
face immigration or employment consequences. They must focus on the type
of convictions: violent, drug, and sex offenses each carry consequences
specific to that category. Margaret Love recommends that defenders take time
to explore with their clients ways to avoid or mitigate collateral consequences,
both by negotiating with the government at the front end of cases and through
relief mechanisms at the back end.31 And, as Professor Ron Wright suggests,
defense lawyers can band together into larger public-defender organizations
with in-house immigration and collateral-consequence experts, to better handle
complex areas in which not all line attorneys can become experts.32
Padilla cannot revolutionize criminal justice; our system suffers from too
many pathologies for a single decision to fix. But it is a welcome recognition
that defendants are not fully informed rational actors who need only the
negative rights to be free of threats, broken promises, lies, and bribes. They
need affirmative help from their defense counsel to evaluate the fairness and
desirability of their pleas, and Padilla is an important step in that direction.

30. Id. at 689–90.
31. Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From
Internal Punishment to Regulation, 30 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 113–16 (2011).
32. Ronald F. Wright, Padilla and the Delivery of Integrated Criminal Defense, 58 UCLA L.
REV. 1515, 1536–39 (2011).

